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Puffer	Fish	and	Bargaining	Chips:	Why	hard
bargaining	harms	British	interests
When	it	comes	to	Brexit,	there’s	no	doubt	that	UK	negotiators	have	adopted	a	hard	bargaining
strategy.	Benjamin	Martill	asks	whether	this	is	the	best	strategy	for	advancing	British	interests.
The	New	Politics	of	Bargaining
All	eyes	in	British	politics	are	on	the	negotiations	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	over	the	terms	of	the
forthcoming	British	withdrawal	from	the	Union,	or	Brexit.	Surprisingly,	questions	of	bargaining
strategy	–	once	the	preserve	of	diplomats	and	niche	academic	journals	–	have	become	some	of	the	most	defining
issues	in	contemporary	British	politics.
Cabinet	disagreements	over	the	conduct	of	the	negotiations	led	to	the	resignation	of	David	Davis	and	Boris	Johnson
in	early	July	2018	and	the	issue	continues	to	divide	the	ruling	Conservative	party.	Theresa	May’s	most	recent
statements	have	all	addressed	the	question	of	how	hard	she	has	pushed	Brussels	in	the	talks.
But	is	the	hard	bargaining	strategy	appropriate,	or	will	it	ultimately	harm	the	UK?	The	salience	of	this	question	should
occasion	deeper	analysis	of	the	fundamentals	of	international	bargaining,	given	the	extent	to	which	the	course	of
British	politics	will	be	determined	by	the	government’s	performance	(or	perceived	performance)	in	the	Brexit	talks.
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Driving	a	Hard	Bargain
A	hard-bargaining	strategy	isn’t	necessarily	a	poor	one.	To	the	extent	it	is	workable,	it	may	even	represent	the
sensible	option	for	the	UK.
Hard	bargaining	is	characterised	by	negative	representations	of	negotiating	partners,	unwillingness	to	make
concessions,	issuance	of	unrealistic	demands,	threats	to	damage	the	partner	or	exit	the	negotiations,	representations
of	the	talks	in	zero-sum	terms,	failure	to	provide	argumentation	and	evidence,	and	withholding	of	information.	From
diplomats’	portrayal	of	the	EU	as	an	uncooperative	and	bullying	negotiating	partner	to	a	set	of	demands	recognised
as	unrealistic	in	Brussels	and	Britain	alike,	the	UK’s	approach	to	the	Brexit	negotiations	scores	highly	on	each	of
these	measures.
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The	consensus	in	the	academic	literature	is	generally	that	hard	bargaining	works	only	where	a	given	party	has	a
relative	advantage.	Powerful	states	have	an	incentive	to	engage	in	hard	bargaining,	since	by	doing	so	they	will	be
able	to	extract	greater	concessions	from	weaker	partners	and	maximise	the	chance	of	achieving	an	agreement	on
beneficial	terms.
But	weaker	actors	have	less	incentive	to	engage	in	hard	bargaining,	since	they	stand	to	lose	more	materially	if	talks
break	down	and	reputationally	if	they’re	seen	as	not	being	backed	by	sufficient	power,
So	which	is	Britain?
The	Power	Distribution
The	success	of	hard	bargaining	depends	on	the	balance	of	power.	But	even	a	cursory	examination	would	seem	to
confirm	that	the	UK	does	not	hold	the	upper	hand	in	the	negotiations.	Consider	three	standard	measures	of
bargaining	power:	a	country’s	economic	and	military	capabilities,	the	available	alternatives	to	making	a	deal,	and	the
degree	of	constraint	emanating	from	the	public.
When	it	comes	to	capabilities,	the	UK	is	a	powerful	state	with	considerable	economic	clout	and	greater	military
resources	than	its	size	would	typically	warrant.	It	is	the	second-largest	economy	in	the	EU	(behind	Germany)	and	its
GDP	is	equal	to	that	of	the	smallest	19	member	states.	And	yet	in	relative	terms,	the	combined	economic	and	military
power	of	the	EU27	dwarves	that	of	the	UK:	the	EU	economy	is	five	times	the	size	of	the	UK’s.
Next,	consider	the	alternatives.	A	‘no	deal’	scenario	would	be	damaging	for	both	the	UK	and	the	EU,	but	the	impact
would	be	more	diffuse	for	the	EU	member	states.	They	would	each	lose	one	trading	partner,	whereas	the	UK	would
lose	all	of	its	regional	trading	partners.	Moreover,	the	other	powers	and	regional	blocs	often	cited	as	alternative
trading	partners	(the	US,	China,	the	Commonwealth,	ASEAN)	are	not	as	open	as	the	EU	economy	to	participation	by
external	parties,	nor	are	they	geographically	proximate	(the	greatest	determinant	of	trade	flows),	nor		will	any	deal	be
able	to	replicate	the	common	regulatory	structure	in	place	in	the	EU.	This	asymmetric	interdependence	strongly
suggests	that	the	UK	is	in	greater	need	of	a	deal	than	the	EU.
Finally,	consider	the	extent	of	domestic	constraints.	Constraint	enhances	power	by	credibly	preventing	a	leader	from
offering	too	generous	a	deal	to	the	other	side.	On	the	EU	side	the	constraints	are	clear:	Barnier	receives	his	mandate
from	the	European	Council	(i.e.	the	member	states)	to	whom	he	reports	frequently.	When	asked	to	go	off-piste	in	the
negotiations,	he	has	replied	that	he	does	not	have	the	mandate	to	do	so.	On	the	UK	side,	by	contrast,	there	is	no
such	mandate.	British	negotiators	continually	cite	Eurosceptic	opposition	to	the	EU’s	proposals	in	the	cabinet,	the
Conservative	party,	and	the	public,	but	they	are	unable	to	guarantee	any	agreement	will	receive	legislative	assent,
and	cannot	cite	any	unified	position.
Perceptions	of	Power
But	the	real	power	distribution	is	not	the	only	thing	that	matters.	While	the	EU	is	the	more	powerful	actor	on	objective
criteria,	a	number	of	key	assumptions	and	claims	made	by	the	Brexiteers	have	served	to	reinforce	the	perception	that
Britain	has	the	upper	hand.
First,	on	the	question	of	capabilities,	the	discourse	of	British	greatness	(often	based	on	past	notions	of	power	and
prestige)	belies	the	UK’s	status	as	a	middle	power	(at	best)	and	raises	unrealistic	expectations	of	what	Britain’s
economic	and	military	resources	amount	to.	Second,	on	the	question	of	alternatives,	the	oft-repeated	emphasis	on
‘global	Britain’	and	the	UK’s	stated	aim	to	build	bridges	with	its	friends	and	allies	around	the	globe	understates	the
UK’s	reliance	on	Europe,	the	(low)	demand	for	relations	with	an	independent	Britain	abroad,	and	the	value	of	free
trade	agreements	or	other	such	arrangements	with	third	countries	for	the	UK.	Third,	on	the	question	of	domestic
constraint,	the	post-referendum	discourse	of	an	indivisible	people	whose	wishes	will	be	fulfilled	only	through	the
implementation	of	the	Brexit	mandate	belies	the	lack	of	consensus	in	British	politics	and	the	absence	of	a	stable
majority	for	either	of	the	potential	Brexit	options,	including	the	‘no	deal’,	‘hard’,	or	‘soft’	variants	of	Brexit.	Invoking	‘the
people’	as	a	constraint	on	international	action,	in	such	circumstances,	is	simply	not	credible.
Conclusion
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Assumptions	about	Britain’s	status	as	a	global	power,	the	myriad	alternatives	in	the	wider	world,	and	the	unity	of	the
public	mandate	for	Brexit,	have	contributed	to	the	overstatement	of	the	UK’s	bargaining	power	and	the	(false)	belief
that	hard	bargaining	will	prove	a	winning	strategy.
Britain	desperately	needs	to	have	an	honest	conversation	about	the	limits	of	the	UK’s	bargaining	power.	This	is	not
‘treasonous’,	as	ardent	Brexiteers	have	labelled	similar	nods	to	reality,	but	is	rather	the	only	way	to	ensure	that
strategies	designed	to	protect	the	national	interest	actually	serve	this	purpose.	Power	is	a	finite	resource	that	cannot
be	talked	into	existence.	Like	a	deflating	puffer	fish,	the	UK’s	weakness	will	eventually	become	plain	to	see.	The	risk
is	that	before	this	occurs,	all	bridges	will	be	burned,	all	avenues	exhausted,	and	all	feathers	ruffled.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	neither	those	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog	nor	of	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared
on	the	Dahrendorf	Forum	blog.
Benjamin	Martill	is	a	Dahrendorf	Forum	Post-Doctoral	Fellow	at	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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